

Week 8 Outline

Outline:

Recapitulation.

I. The Social Metaphysics of Normativity

- 1) Normative statuses and normative attitudes.
- 2) Normative attitudes of attribution and acknowledgment. Context of assessment/deliberation. (Compare: normative statuses of commitment and entitlement.)
- 3) JTB example, in a *pragmatic* MV.
- 4) Traditional status-dependence of normative attitudes vs. Modern attitude-dependence of normative statuses. Contract theories of political obligation, see norms as emerging from attitudes of those governed.
- 5) Kant on autonomy.
- 6) Hegel on reciprocal recognition.

II. Making Normative Attitudes/Statuses Explicit in an Extension of the Base Vocabulary: From Attributions to Ascriptions

- 1) Making attitudes and statuses explicit. From attribution to ascription.
- 2) In ascribing one is doing *two* things, *attributing* one doxastic commitment and *acknowledging/undertaking* another.
- 3) *De dicto/de re* for tenses.
- 4) *De dicto/de re* for ascriptions. A regimentation.
- 5) ^s Scare quotes^s as the dual of *de re* ascriptions.

III. *De Re* Ascriptions and Representational Uptake

- 1) The primary representational locution in ordinary language, the one we use to talk about the representational dimension of our thought and talk, to specify what we are thinking and talking *about*, is *de re* ascriptions of propositional attitude.
- 2) What one is *doing* in using such expressions is explicitly marking the difference of social perspective between *attributing* a commitment and *acknowledging* it.
- 3) Q: What does it mean that the distinction between what we *say* and what we talk *about* makes explicit a distinction, implicit in what we *do*, of social perspective?